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11. INTRODUCTION
All individual modes of discourse about national and other 
development tendentionsly conceal some of the realities involved, 
while ostensibly revealing others. Commentary and argumentation 
about development in Africa is not necessarily more prone to a 
peculiar and (in its context sometimes pernicious) recourse to a 
game of cultural utterance than is such commentary elsewhere. But 
it is no exception either.
The general subject of this paper (1) is the exploration of some 
common elements in utterance patterns in commentary on, and 
analysis of, public affairs and development. In brief: spoken or 
written recourse to a mode or style of cultural discourse is 
examined. Specifically the focus is on a development discourse, 
which turns heavily on 'culture exchanged for politics'. Since 
politics is partly about economics, one could add '... and for 
economics'. This paper aims to examine such exchange.
Argumentation about 'tribe' and 'tradition', whether in or about 
Africa (especially in the case of the former), Asia, Europe or 
elsewhere, is one of the commonest examples of such exchange. 
Sometimes patterns of utterance about public affairs are matters 
of analytical and methodological habit, simply, with no apparent 
serious intent. Sometimes the ' exchange will be done with 
deliberate intent; perhaps to conceal and defraud. In either 
case, however, the strategy and tactics which are followed may 
vary. Moveover, this paper's use of the exchange metaphor is not 
altogether appropriate. Deflection, substitution and various 
other gambits are involved. Thus this paper proceeds only with 
considerable reservations of its own about the description it 
starts with of what is after all a whole pattern of 
argumentation, which cannot very satisfactorily be reduced to 
just one of its parts. Why then proceed at all? Because, believe 
it at this stage or not, if deconstructive analysis is pursued of 
perceived cultural distance and recourse to peculiarly inclusive 
cultural utterance from which political and economic issues and 
logics are excluded on that plane virtually altogether, nothing 
less than what may prove to be a law of discourse and human 
communication emerges.
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2fortunes). Academic approaches in the social sciences to 
'structural/functional' and 'games' theory alike, constantly fail 
to .address this parameter of 'finding form', because of their 
habit of simply subsuming the actual in the ideal in their most 
generalized formulations. Habitual patterns of speech and 
argumentation are not necessarily the most important winning or 
losing shots or encounters in plays or ploys. But they are seldom 
without influence altogether on the final outcome or score: 
'knowing what to say: saying the right thing', is usually part of 
what counts in an interaction. Therefore development studies dare 
not neglect this zone.
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operation of a basic social or cultural unit or rather something 
more like an ideological idea; constitute, in effect, an ethnic 
identity long predating colonial culture contact and rule which 
through various educational and other processes has gradually 
become internationalised in a socialization process with various 
results. No doubt an even longer list could be composed of 
substantive possibilities which research in social science, 
ethnology and history has entertained. The research involved 
stems mainly from social anthropological thinking, in African and 
other studies, in the 1960s (2), and earlier.
Similarly, in what precisely 'tradition' in Africa and elsewhere 
in the world consists, has also often been the subject of 
substantive inquiries. For example it has been questioned whether 
this or that trait is necessarily tenacious or not in the face of 
economic change, is conducive or obstructive to this or that 
proposed development, and so forth.
These sorts of studies of 'tribe' and 'tradition' may be of 
considerable interest and ingenuity in themselves. Mostly however 
they miss entirely the extent to which, the occasions when, and 
the reasons why, people have or do not have recourse to these 
concepts, regardless of whether or not they are historically or 
ethnologicallv 'mistaken'. With patterns of word and will and 
sometimes deed, the context and purpose of argumentation and 
actions is seldom less important than the event of the 'text 
itself'. Yet this whole subject of the plans and meanings which 
are current and acted upon by a population escapes inquiry 
altogether in the conventional sorts of positivist and
3essentialist inquiries that predominate in comparative 
development studies. There are traditions in social and economic 
research method to examine, as well as traditions in societies. 
However except in 'polemical' writing on 'schools' these are more 
often taken for granted than inquired into.
2. CULTURAL DISCOURSE AND PERCEIVED CULTURAL DISTANCE.
Some sorts of commentary and analysis about development conducted 
from afar, whether spatially or temporally, rely heavily on 
recourse to cultural discourse. What tends to happen in 
commentary carried out only at some considerable distance is that 
only cultural positions are taken where better informed analysis 
and judgement would want to take economic and political as well 
as cultural positions. After all, the development being examined 
is likely to be as much political and economic as well as 
cultural. Utterance about development not from afar, but at home, 
sometimes shows a similar tendency. Such cultural recourse as in 
these two instances may not be for the same reasons. Nonetheless 
there would be little point for example in looking for just two 
sets of reasons for such recourse, one for that in other 
countries, one for that in one's own. There would be little point 
either in looking for just two varieties of such discourse, one 
for poorer and one for richer, countries. This may appear to make 
our task more difficult than otherwise it could be. Even for 
defined sets of situations, however the trumpeting of single 
explanations in comparative studies may tell us more about the 
issue of intellectual property and its management than the issue 
that is supposedly on the agenda.
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4Of course, this is not an unconditional phenomenon. So, what is 
its context and frame? Some of the conditionality is as follows:
(a) It is important that the explanatory quest should be for 
not just probability or good likelihood' of fit, but for nothing 
less than absolute certainty of fit. For such discourse, only 
some form of absolute position could show mastery of the subject 
at issue. Further there is an underlying position: what is to be 
explained, or even just described, is 'in itself' so untoward, so 
strange, so elusive, that grasping it partly would be not to 
grasp it at all.
(b) A second necessary but still not sufficient condition is: 
what such commentary says it seeks is something which it believes 
to be very distinctive and particular, not something that in 
other circumstances and situations elsewhere would be seen, if in 
another version, to be familiar. So it looks for 'tribalism' 
rather than, say, 'localism'.
(c) Third the domain of culture should offer a peculiarly 
fertile hunting ground for such absolute certainty plus peculiar 
particularity. The conventional concept of 'culture' (since at 
least the nineteenth century) readily offers what seems to be 
required, namely something thought of as being transcendent but 
also as having immanent logic and validity of its own. This is 
the case as regards both beliefs and actual behaviour, between 
which RCD may draw no distinction. Conveniently, also, cultural 
identification and exegesis is scholastically and professionally 
a respectable, if somewhat arcane, task. It simply would not do 
for the best such commentary to stoop to popular and prejudiced 
utterance, for instance about irrationality and the like, that 
would be unlikely to offer much scope for a sharp and clear 
analysis anyway.
(d) PCD-RCD does not have to arise in all instances of allusion 
to 'tribe' or 'tradition' for it to arise in some. In discourse 
about particular tribes or traditions which are not believed by 
the speaker to be very different from each other ('i don't 
personally think that there is any more difference between the 
Ndebeles and the Shonas than there is between the Karangas and 
the Zezurus' may say a Shona or a Ndebele or indeed anyone else), 
PCD-RCD may be non-existent or weak (or, as in the instance just 
cited, displaced (and not all CD has necessarily PCD to handle).
(e) Stratagems of recourse in commentary to 'ancestral' 
tradition, i.e something deemed to be old if not immemorial and 
therefore distant in origin, even if it is believed further that 
some of that tradition either still exists or should be restored, 
involves PCD. Whether or not such and such a tradition did 
actually exist, substantively, long ago or for that matter ever, 
it is posited that it did. An example from agrarian utterance 
illustrates this perfectly (and will therefore be given at this 
juncture at some length). 'African land tenure' of a type in
5Eastern.and Southern Africa deemed 'traditional' and as such 
coming up for frequent mention in rural development planning, is 
a very common case of substituting merely cultural positions for 
cultural plus political plus economic positions. For example, it 
will be said just that 'traditional' land holding was based just 
on 'allocation' by rulers, 'rulers' here being regarded as 
'natural' authorities for this purpose, not as political or 
economic agents with interests of their own as well as of others 
at stake.
This is precisely a kind of saying that conceals more than it 
reveals. In it 'allocation' - precisely as in so many other of 
its usages and referents in development studies - both assumes a 
whole process of administration (in the sense of assuming it 
away) and ignores even the logistics of such administration. As a 
result the entire political economy of land thus gets left aside. 
Worse, through the particular means chosen of leaving all this 
aside, what is thus obviated gets ruled out as being of no 
consequence anyway ('land is plentiful'). Instead there will 'at 
best be only some restricted debate as to whether rights of avail 
are more germane to the situation than rights of ownership, or 
whether reversionary rights operate on the moving away (or the 
decease) of a holder, and,if so, with what effects-(4).
Now admittedly to take up any debate, at all on the matter of 
reversionary rights as a substantive issue is already to move 
away from only formal, constitutional, issues. It moves a little 
away, too, from that cultural depiction which is always of a 
supposed equilibrium st-ate of affairs, a state which becomes 
ruffled or disturbed only by exotic factors such as the spread of 
cash economy - 'cash here meaning individual in some sense and 
'traditional' signifying collective or communal. But what is 
still not addressed is nothing so awkward and possibly nasty as 
power relations. Not even moderate exchange values are allowed to 
enter the picture before the said impact on it of cash economy 
(5).
Worse, absence (immemorial being long ago and far away) of data 
on such matters is read as meaning that no such data is 
necessary: there is no purpose for which such data is required.
But could this in actuality really have been the case? If land 
had to be allocated, then obviously it was not a free good. 
Surely it must therefore have been scarce and valuable to some 
extent - land everywhere varies in its positional value if 
nothing else. Physically its extent and ecology and so forth will 
vary as well. So, whether land rights in systems deemed 
traditional (read 'communal'), were or were not or are or are not 
of usufruct not ownership, subject or not to reversion, and so 
on, politics and economics must always have been part of the 
total picture and actual operation. It is therefore inconceivable 
that nothing but cultural traits and ideas were or are involved. 
Yet such inconceivability simply does not even arise. RCD takes
6its place instead.
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7At home, just CD as well as RCD are never as non-controversial as 
from afar they may appear to be. This could be owing to' any 
number of. political and economic processes, repression and 
exploitation included, as well as to quite innocent pursuits.. 
However it is unlikely that the official pronouncements which 
constitute the available material will even allude to any of 
these
(g) The greater the R in RCD, the sharper will be the focus on 
valuation of the culture or cultural item concerned. Normally 
either an absolutely negative, or an absolutely positive 
valuation prevails, nothing in between: shades of valuation are 
out. Maoist China from afar was either a heaven on earth or a 
hell on earth, its Chairman either a god or a devil. Ujamaa-ist 
Tanzania seen from afar was similarly perceived (its president 
either 'the only President in Africa of unquestionably good 
intentions' or 'a ruthless - and dangerous and skillful 
opportunist'). In either case really any kind of moderated 
discussion at all (e.g. to speak of 'certain errors of policy 
such that Tanzania's agricultural crisis was partly of its own 
making') is virtually ruled out.
Thus especially as it. may be represented externally, nationalism 
at first in this sort of context makes its mark more as a matter 
of RCD than substantive history. As such this is an 'ism' with 
more (certain kinds of) political and ■ economic input 
internationally than nationally. If nationalism is thus also 
internationalism, it is not an obstacle or an alternative to 
internationalism.
(h) Something or someone coming out of the perceived, and into, 
the perceiving, world, and not fitting in with the preconceived 
valuation, will be treated as a categorical exception. ('When an 
actual freed and literate slave, Job ben Solomon, appeared in 
Georgian London, he delighted the capital's society and did not 
change the slaver's habits. As Montesquieu had noticed in 1748, 
Europeans could not consider Africans as men "because, allowing 
them to be men, a suspicion would follow that we ourselves are 
not Christian". Thus ben Solomon had to be treated as an 
exception, as an African prince'(8).
Academic.disciplines as well as societies and individuals engage 
in such exchanges ( 'Before 1926, when Malinowski's work on crime 
and sex and repression in what he ironically termed 'Savage 
Society' began to be published, anthropology had already 
developed from collecting the quaint habits of primitive peoples, 
in order to prove their inferiority and lawlessness, into a total 
effor.t to record their tribal lives, in order to prove that they 
were wholly bound by totem and taboo and group - in fact, that 
they were the most law abiding people on earth'(9)).
(i) A further tendency is for RCD to be shaped by the analytic, 
conventions of the method of review and assessment chosen. The
weaker these conventions in their provision to deal with now not 
RCD or CD or even C but just c, compared with the better 
provision made in these same conventions to deal with economics 
and perhaps politics also, the stronger the role assigned to them 
will be.
This is paradoxical. Recourse to such conventions in effect end 
up by taking a view, whether, actively or passively, that one 
particular element - c - in the whole is particularly important 
or unimportant. But at the same time it confesses its inadequacy 
to deal with this one element, either at all or satisfactorily. 
So, entirely because of the conventions of the method of 
analysis or commentary chosen, 'c' gets to be either maximised or 
minimised. Again nothing in between is entertained.
(j) Finally, no doubt a fuller analysis of configurations of 
recourse to cultural utterance in commentaries and analyses about 
development and planning would reveal several other features to 
those sketched here. Not least, culturally there will be some 
constraints and rules to be observed, for instance as to what can 
and cannot be said without, fear of immediate counter-effect. 
Also, by whom and how and when cultural argumentation about 
development arises, will to some extent vary from culture to 
culture. This too is a zone of conditionality for a fuller 
analysis to determine. All that is being attempted in the present 
paper is an initial and exploratory scene-setting. A further 
phase of such inquiry would be that of comparison, across 
different cultures, of contrasting cases.
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Nothing less than a post World War II caesura is said to be 
involved, or even 'the most powerful image possibly in the whole 
of the twentieth century'. Its perceived content of culture is 
very close to Karl Popper s third world (probably the 
terminological similarity is coincidental) of myths and 
sensations as data which belong neither to art nor science. What 
was even more at issue was an invention of a world that was 
supposedly neither capitalist nor socialist, but a world just^ of 
or for planned change, development, popular participation, 
decentralization and structural change and the like. The Third 
World image exchanges culture for both capitalist and, socialist 
politics and economics, in its internal and external relations 
alike. Any matters of politics and economics which do break 
through this would-be wholesale cultural disguise, are surprises, 
shocks, even crises. Talk begins of intervention, stabilization, 
and the like.
Social labels may be supposed to describe the contents of the 
merely containers to which they are affixed. But subtly they may 
also seek to persuade the audience of the value of these contents 
i.e. to prescribe as well as to describe. ^The Third World has 
no internal politics, but only culturics ( suprisingly the Blacks 
in South Africa are not united' said the Time or Newsweek in some 
initial reporting of some recent events there).
The recent appearance on the international scene of language^ of 
non-geographical, even ageographical but seemingly spatial, 
expressions (North and South) is a further culturalization in RCD 
now of space - especially-economic space - rather than of 
persons, groups, or worlds. It has some advantages (Japan which 
formerly had to be squeezed into the West can now be allocated 
less inconveniently to North). Polarities are anyway easier to 
handle in utterance about mutuality (such as in the Brandt 
Report), than trilateralities, for dramatic effect. While 
seemingly repelling they are poles of attraction too. Middle of 
the road, equatorial, theories of truth, have much less appeal to 
either polar party.
4. THE SUBSTANTIVE BEHIND THE DISCURSIVE
The impression may have been given in this paper that, while 
there is always something discursive in or behind the 
substantive, there is nothing substantive in the discursive. 
This, however, is not necessarily so.It is far from being the 
case for instance with PCD-RCD commentary for instance on voting 
patterns ('the Langi were loyal to Obote ) or, indeed, what is 
called a lack of tribal base ('Nyerere comes from a very small 
and not powerful tribe'). Undoubtedly there are, among other 
patterns in voting and other acts, regional or subregional and if 
you will ethnic patterns as well. But PCD-RCD discourse practice,
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whether deliberated or habitual, singles out only these patterns 
from all others and then pretends that others do not exist. As 
with any discourse practice, the reasons and other circumstances 
involved in this particular case vary too. But some recurring 
features stand out. One common feature is, again, a form of 
reductionist commentary. Very commonly culture is reduced to just 
one basic organizing principle or unit ("African culture is 
basically tribal culture"). Such commentary on African political 
and economic development ( 'KANU has favoured the Kikuyu') is 
still one of the commonest kinds of commentary in African 
studies. Home-grown PCD-RCD in this form (even in a double sense: 
'if you have people in the ruling party who fall into the trap of 
talking tribalism because they are frustrated by the problems of 
Matabeleland they will actually be helping parochial nationalists 
who want to create problems') offer ready-made reinforcements for 
culturalisms from without.
A second common feature of such exchanges of culture for politics 
and economics is for affirmations which at least have the merit- 
of starting out as being pluralist in some sense ( 'Obote rules by 
tribalism, nepotism and repression'),to end up by forgetting this 
as it were promisingly variegated start. What happens instead of 
bringing forth something more qualified is that argumentation 
returns to just tribalism alone, finding it guilty by 
association. But what gives it this negative character is not 
even established, let alone analysed. Under PCD-RCD rules of 
commentary, politics and economics - in the case under discussion 
nepotism and repression - are exchanged for just culture - here 
tribalism. Any realistic analysis would require descriptive 
demonstration of such associations at least. Again, little of the 
pertinent political and economic information is available (until 
revealed not by a Commonwealth Commission majority-opinion in the 
case recently of Uganda but by Amnesty International and even a 
Private Eye). Certainly some information is likely to be 
unavailable simply for the reason that it is supposed to be kept 
secret.
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Government embrace at any given time, are usually not 
personalised. More commonly, they are borrowed standards, such as 
'socialism'. For home as- well as foreign consumption, any other 
kind of recourse may appear, as at best unnecessary or dangerous 
to those who would depend on it.
A domestication function served by symbolization of the Head 
person concerned (for example, 'Mzee' or 'Mwalimu', is convenient 
where, as in particular kinds of RCD, PCD is or should be minimal 
or non-existent. Also this is a discursive context in which 
one-party state ideas can circulate easily (already at one 
discursive remove from government), not as no-party but one-party 
representations. Externally, as PCD increases, this can be read 
as a party-based organization even if, for RCD-expressed reasons, 
there is only one party.
Certainly some sorts of exchange and other effects of discursive 
structures of policy commentary and argumentation . work in this 
way. Thus, policy analysis does not always have to limit.itself to 
matters of interests and values before a serious assessment of 
policy could be essayed. Of course this is not to say that 
interests and values are not at stake as well as discourse. 
Rather it is that the semantics of development and development 
strategies and development analysis repay attention as guides 
also to politics and economics as well as semantics. •
A third feature is that if, on the basis of other information, 
one were actually to try to look realistically into political and 
economic dimensions, the preferred cultural thrust of the 
discourse could be weakened. Thus it may be made to appear that 
such other information is not wanted. Culture is a conveniently 
uniform blanket when it is seen as something that is common to a 
population. A population is then called a people, with a culture 
that is shared by all equally, regardless of rank, gender and 
occupation. Per contra, by definition, nepotism is selective: 
included are some persons, excluded are some other persons. 
Repression is similar yet also something different again: without 
at'least some degree of compliance from the repressed groups, in 
theory and practice as well one suspects, such dominance would be 
impossible.
When PCD-RCD makes reference rather to 'tradition' than to 
'tribe', a wider discursive strategy may be involved: not least, 
one tradition may be common to more than one tribe. This strategy 
is also worthy of notice. One feature is that a President or 
Chief appealing to'our cultural tradition' in an official 
pronouncement on a substantive development policy or programme, 
may be so doing - be obliged so to do - because there is no other 
accessible legitimacy to appeal to, for example, a democratic and 
political legitimacy. . Such appeals link with variations on a 
further theme, namely cultural utterance about economy. Cultural 
polemics of this sort are about what modernizationists and others 
in development studies call 'political culture' and 'economic
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cultureThey attribute the legitimacy, or success, or failure, 
or some other quality of a policy not to economics or politics 
but to the culture of economics or of politics.
In mid 1982, a BBC talk by a former Philippine Senator who had by 
then become a civil rights lawyer, taking an opposition stance to 
the Marcos regime, took up this subject dramatically. He 
observed: "Two justifications for authoritarianism are currently 
fashionable in Asian developing countries. One is that Asian 
societies (culturally and traditionally) are authoritarian and 
paternalistic and so need * governments which are also 
authoritarian and paternalistic; that Asia's hungry masses are 
too concerned with filling their own stomachs to concern 
themselves with civil liberties and political freedoms; that, in 
short, Asians are not fit for human rights. Another is that 
developing countries must sacrifice freedom temporariy to achieve 
the rapid economic development that their exploding populations 
(and shrinking resources) and rising expectations demand. In 
short, that governments must be authoritarian to promote 
development"(10)
It would not be difficult to find a number of similar instances 
in African argumentation about human rights and development. This 
Filipino lawyer's response to the problematic he poses for his 
own country so clearly is also familiar in some African 
positions: "The first justification is racist nonsense. The 
second is a lie; authoritarianism is not needed for development; 
what it is needed is to maintain the status quo. Development is 
also people deciding what food, clothing and shelter are adequate 
and how these are to be provided". '
Of outside attributions of development to 'tradition' not in the 
case of the continuity but the collapse of a status quo, examples 
may also be drawn from outside Africa. Was not the fall of the 
Shah in Iran blamed on an ancient moral and religious code which 
provoked an almost metaphysical rebellion against modernization 
by one-of the chief spokesmen of the US foreign policy which was 
then ruined?(ll). Admittedly, what were called 'legitimate' 
grievances were blamed too. Nevertheless it was Iran's social and 
religious traditions that were made to carry most of the burden.
One supposition such utterance makes is that such traditions are 
not themselves political and economic as well as cultural. 
Another is that the toppled regime was 'untraditional'. Neither 
supposition (in the case of Iran) can be sustained in the face of 
better informed commentary for long. However, the extent to 
which cultural utterance, either from within or from without, is 
substantively well-based or not, is not this paper's subject 
(admittedly it has not been completely left out either). Rather 
its concern is with a pattern of thought, word and will in which, 
regardless of whether such saying is also believing on the part 
of those expressing themselves in this way, there is a peculiarly 
heavy recourse to cultural utterance. Often, such saying is no
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less instrumental than believing even where 
also. It may, indeed, be more instrumental, 
in cases of habitual rather than incentived
it is not believing 
perhaps particularly 
practice.
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non-African instance just ci 
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traditions lack great moral 
'African' here may be contra 
'Christian' tradition. Afr 
recourse to fundamentalism 
economic) force, other than
commentary about development in 
ion' any similar role to that in the 
ted. One reason is that they start 
ican' - unlike for instance 'Asian' - 
and religious power and pedigree, 
sted with, for instance, 'Arab' and 
ica-watchers have little if any 
as a cultural (and political and 
in micrological instances.
5. WITH WHAT PRACTICAL EFFECTS?
A virus, while harmless to its host, may be highly lethal after 
crossing a species barrier. As with the disease Aids, so with 
PCD-RCD, in looking for the practical effects of either, one 
must at times distinguish between host or bearer and victim. 
This was necessary when the role of the substantive in the 
discursive was addressed in the preceding section of this paper. 
Some practical effects of recourse to cultural discourse were 
brought out there explicitly. The chief net effect of such 
(over) generous exchanges of culture for politics as have now 
been discussed, from the academic point of view of a political 
economy of words and deeds which have practical consequences in 
policy and planning, is an evasion of analysis. So blatant can 
this evasion appear at times, that one may find it difficult not 
to call it deliberate evasion. Admittedy, specious apolitical, 
asocial, ahistorical and ageographical positions could be due as 
much to sheer poverty of ideas and information as to 
ruthlessness. Still, efforts that constantly seek to present 
public affairs as if they were just matters of culture alone are 
peculiar at best. In policy and planning there are always 
interests at stake, as well.
One effect, then, is evasion. Another is blockage: in two 
senses. Political and economic issues are camouflaged behind a 
cultural front. This we have seen throughout this paper. In 
addition, analysis of culture as one dimension among others with 
the interrelations with these others being part and parcel of the 
total situation, is blocked too. A path to a type of commentary 
or policy about development which obfuscates rather than 
illumines these interrelations, is a path to no real commentary 
or policy at all.
In politics, the intended practical effects (which of course may 
or may not be achieved) of 'tribalism' discourse, came within the 
scope of Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer's illuminating early 
(1966) study of Independent Ghana and its economic development 
"Ghana: end of an illusion". They looked into the framing of the
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integral part of the actual practice of discourse.
the case of an /opposition" (the NLM) deemed Right 
government in power as being commonly a candidate 
1, religious, regional label when the reigning 
tform described itself as for unity and national 
ompared tribe-baiting in Ghana then, to red-baiting 
en, but went on to show something of the -different 
ological and other sophistication that both the 
uch labels at others, and the wearing of them 
volved. Their conclusion was "that NLM "tribalism" 
Margery Perham and to Radcliffe-Brown than to the 
lion" and,"included arguments that might have been 
Madisonian structure-functionalist". Economically 
attention to the roles of Ashanti Chiefs as 
d traders, roles as distant from those just of 
one can imagine.
To move nearer the present time while remaining in West Africa, 
The Economist's (1984) Brief on The political economy of Nigeria 
(at p.9) compares the blaming of ills on to "tribalism" with 
just the blaming of "politics" for development errors, lapses or 
obstacles. Its conclusion: "the explanation 'tribalism is an 
admission that the speaker does not understand what is going on 
... The astute observer always bears tribalism in mind, but never 
relies upon it as a sufficient explanation".
So far as such a statement goes (ignoring the politics of 
ignorance and so on), so good. This paper, however, in an initial 
and tentative way, has attempted a broader examination. For 
example it has looked for' some of the context in which discourse 
of a particular sort could be believed to be efficacious and 
therefore worth using. One must assume, up to a point (which has 
something to do with the limits of intellectual ism), that if such 
cultural recourse in argumentation were not considered to be 
capable of having practical effect (whether instrumental or 
expressive), it would not be so persistent. For criticism in 
development planning and other studies just to announce that such 
discourse is "wrong", is futile or itself no less "mistaken" than 
what it rejects.
Similarly, research on "tribalism" that is confined only to 
positions about the substantive or historical accuracy or 
otherwise of sayings and beliefs about "trib?" and "tradition", 
can equally turn out to be as petty and pernicious as the subject 
it addresses. This paper, in an effort to chart a characteristic 
zone of development discourse, has looked for a way out of 
confining discussion so to say of tribalism to tribalism. The 
"ism" involved is identifiable on a wider plane of argumentation 
and communication about public policy and affairs.
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